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Abstract 
 
In the past, customary law has been applied rather haphazardly in the 
courts. Its inherent adaptive flexibility and indeterminate nature 
created confusion in a court system ill-equipped to deal with litigation 
dealing with customary law issues. Understandably, customary law 
was treated in the same way as a common-law custom, which also 
originates in a community's acceptance of certain standards of 
behaviour. This meant that anyone averring a rule of customary law 
had to prove it, except where the rule was contained in a statute or 
precedent. The courts were not keen to engage in law-making and 
where the ascertainment of customary law proved to be difficult, they 
would merely apply the common law. In 1998, the Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act 45 of 1988, which allows the judiciary to take judicial 
notice of readily accessible customary law, made fundamental 
changes to this situation. The Act is still in operation, although it must 
now be interpreted in the light of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution). No direction on how this must 
be done can be found in the wording of the constitutional provisions 
dealing with the customary law. Besides instructing the courts to apply 
customary law when "applicable, subject to the Constitution and any 
legislation that specifically deals with customary law", the Constitution 
is silent on the way forward. Given the fact that most of the judiciary 
does not have any knowledge of the content of living customary law 
and the fact that there are fundamental differences between the 
evidentiary rules applied in the common and customary laws of South 
Africa, a few problems are bound to surface when litigating issues 
involving the customary law. They include: the status of customary 
law in the South African legal system; the applicability of customary 
law; and especially the determination of living customary law. The aim 
of this analysis is to determine if the existing evidentiary rules are 
appropriate to deal with these challenges in litigating matters involving 
customary law in the ordinary courts. 
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1 Introduction 
Customary law is a collective term for the variant of legal systems applicable 
to traditional communities in South Africa. It is oral law, because it is 
essentially unwritten.1 According to Onyango,2 the oral aspect of the 
customary law is based on a social worldview which relies on two 
operational factors: "reliance on the parties in dispute to accept the final 
judgment of the people" and "the fear of upsetting the balance" in the 
community. These two factors give credibility to customary law. The general 
law, on the other hand, is imposed by institutions and laws detached from 
the community. For this reason, customary law has been described as a 
communitarian law consisting of a "body of rules which are recognized as 
obligatory by its members".3 
The communitarian traits of customary law remain the focus of modern 
definitions of customary law. For example, customary law is described as 
follows in the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act:4 
'Customary law' means the customs and usages traditionally observed among 
the indigenous African peoples of South Africa and which form part of the 
culture of those peoples. 
                                            
* Christa Rautenbach. B Iuris LLB LLM LLD (NWU). Professor of Law, North-West 
University, Potchefstroom, South Africa. Email: christa.rautenbach@nwu.ac.za. I am 
indebted to the National Research Foundation (South Africa) and the Alexander von 
Humboldt Foundation (Germany) for their financial assistance, the North-West 
University (South Africa) for research leave, and the Max Planck Institute for Social 
Anthropology in Halle/Saale (Germany) for providing a stimulating research 
environment. As always, I remain responsible for any mistakes and my own 
viewpoints. 
1  Van Niekerk 2008 Fundamina 155-170, 165. The ongoing debates on the difference 
between living and official customary law will not be discussed in this contribution. 
Although my focus is generally on living customary law as a form of oral law, 
reference will also be made to official customary law, which is grounded in statutes 
and precedent. 
2  Onyango African Customary Law 18. He relies on a quote by Kanyeihamba 
Commentaries on Law, Politics and Governance 11. 
3  Elias Nature of African Customary Law 55. 
4  Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. 
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The process of the recognition of customary law5 as a legal system worthy 
to stand alongside its Western6 counterpart ― the common law7 ― was a 
long and winding road to travel,8 but customary law finally received 
constitutional protection in the transitional Constitution9 and again in the 
final Constitution.10 The final Constitution instructs the courts to "apply 
customary law when that law is applicable".11 The words "apply" when it is 
"applicable" seem to be a bit circular, but it is generally accepted that they 
refer to the choice of law rules.12 Nevertheless, the relevant scholarly 
debates deal mostly with theoretical aspects pertaining to the scope and 
meaning of this constitutional directive,13 and not much attention is paid to 
its relevance in legal practice.  
The judiciary, for one, is faced with the intricacies of adjudicating oral law 
within the framework of a fixed set of evidentiary rules, which allows them 
to take judicial notice of the common law,14 however ambiguous, but not of 
customary law when it is uncertain. This is as a result of section 1(1) of the 
Law of Evidence Amendment Act,15 which gives a discretion to the courts 
                                            
5  In the Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters 
Act 11 of 2009 the word "peoples" was replaced by "people" for no apparent reason. 
An earlier definition contained in the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988, 
which is incidentally still in operation, refers to "indigenous law" as "the law or custom 
as applied by the Black tribes in the [South African] Republic". The terms "indigenous 
law" and "customary law" are used synonymously in the literature. These definitions 
are not without problems. See, for example, Rautenbach and Bekker Introduction to 
Legal Pluralism 18-20. 
6  "Western" in this context refers to the two countries which played a major role in the 
colonisation of South Africa, namely the Netherlands (more specifically the province 
of Holland in the 17th century, which ruled from 1652-1795 and again from 1803-
1806) and Britain, which ruled from 1795-1803 and again from 1806-1961. 
7  The term "common law" used here does not refer to English common law but to the 
mix of Roman-Dutch and English law distinguishable from customary law. 
8  For a general overview of the historical development, see the South African Law 
Commission (SALC) (renamed the South African Law Reform Commission in 2003) 
Report on the Harmonisation of the Common and the Indigenous Law 5-12 and the 
sources cited there. 
9  Customary law was recognised in s 181 and Principle XIII of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993 (the transitional Constitution). 
10  Customary law is recognised in s 211 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 (the final Constitution or Constitution). See in general Rautenbach 2003 
Stell LR 107-114. 
11  Section 211(3) of the Constitution. 
12  Rautenbach and Bekker Introduction to Legal Pluralism 39. 
13  See the sources cited in Rautenbach and Bekker Introduction to Legal Pluralism 48-
53. 
14  As explained by Schwikkard et al Principles of Evidence 489-490, a party may not 
lead evidence in order to prove or clarify a legal common law rule although they may 
do so by way of argument. Also see Zeffert and Paizes South African Law of 
Evidence 877. 
15  Section 1(1) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988. Although the 
common law rules allow for judicial notice in the case of the rules of the common law 
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to take judicial notice of customary law only when it "can be ascertained 
readily and with sufficient certainty". The courts are in no position to take 
judicial notice of living customary law because it is as yet an unrecorded 
social practice known only to the community.16 
Before the Law of Evidence Amendment Act, customary law was applied in 
the courts rather haphazardly. Its inherent adaptive flexibility and 
indeterminate nature created confusion in a court system ill-equipped to 
deal with litigation where the customary law was involved. Understandably, 
customary law was treated in the same way as a common-law custom, 
which also originates in a community's acceptance of certain standards of 
behaviour.17 This meant that anyone averring a rule of customary law had 
to prove it, except where the rule was contained in a statute or precedent. 
As explained by Bennett, the equation of common-law custom and 
customary law was the court's way of indirectly acknowledging that "it had 
no competence to pronounce on rules generated by community practice".18 
The courts were not keen to engage in law-making, and where the 
ascertainment of customary law proved to be difficult they would merely 
apply the common law.19 We thus found the interesting situation that 
customary law was treated by the judiciary both as a question of fact and a 
question of law. Living customary law was deemed to be a question of fact 
which could be established only by evidence, and since official customary 
law could be authenticated by reference to written texts, it was deemed to 
be a question of law.20 
The Law of Evidence Amendment Act21 that allows the judiciary to take 
judicial notice of readily accessible customary law is still in operation, 
although it must now be interpreted in the light of the Constitution.22 No 
direction on how this must be done can be found in the wording of the 
constitutional provisions dealing with the customary law. Besides instructing 
the courts to apply customary law when "applicable, subject to the 
                                            
and established facts, those rules do not allow for judicial notice in the case of the 
rules of the customary law. See the discussion at 4 below. 
16  Rautenbach and Bekker Introduction to Legal Pluralism 48. 
17  See the discussion by Bennett Sourcebook of African Customary Law 138. Breda v 
Jacobs 1921 AD 330, namely: the custom must have been in existence for a long 
period; the relevant community must generally observe the custom; and the custom 
must be reasonable.  
18  Bennett Sourcebook of African Customary Law 138. 
19  Bennett Sourcebook of African Customary Law 140. 
20  Bennett Sourcebook of African Customary Law 141. 
21  Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988. 
22  Section 39(2) of the Constitution provides as follows: "When interpreting any 
legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, every court, 
tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights." 
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Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals with customary law", 
the Constitution is silent on the way forward. Given the fact that most of the 
judiciary does not have any knowledge of the content of living customary 
law,23 and the fact that there are fundamental differences between the 
evidentiary rules applied in the common and customary laws of South 
Africa,24 a few problems are bound to surface when litigating issues 
involving the customary law. They include: the status of customary law in 
the South African legal system;25 the applicability of customary law;26 and 
especially the determination of living customary law.27 
Fortunately, a number of high court judgments have been delivered dealing 
with most of these issues. South Africa follows the rule of stare decisis, and 
precedent is thus an important source of law.28 The discussion that follows 
deals with a few of these pioneering decisions and the principles we can 
glean from them. The aim of this analysis is to determine if the existing 
evidentiary rules are appropriate to accommodating the challenges oral law 
presents in litigating matters involving customary law in the ordinary courts. 
                                            
23  Some law schools have introductory undergraduate courses dealing with a very 
basic overview of customary law. However, these courses deal mainly with official 
customary law because living customary law is difficult to teach for a number of 
reasons, one being its ever-changing nature and another its close connection with 
specific communities. 
24  A few of those differences include the following: "(a) the legal range of customary 
law is narrower than that of the common law; (b) customary law is based on the 
ethos of reconciliation and solidarity, rather than vindication and individuality, which 
are salient features of the common law; (c) a single unified system of customary law 
does not exist, whilst the common law (although largely uncodified) consists of 
unified legal rules; and (d) customary law is 'living' law which depends for the most 
part on social practices, whilst the common law can be found in written authorities 
(old authorities, statutes, judicial decisions and custom)". See Rautenbach "Mixing 
South African Common and Customary Law of Intestate Succession" 222-240, 237. 
In addition, the customary courts are community courts where the traditional leader 
performs "judicial" functions in addition to his or her executive functions. The 
proceedings in the court are usually informal and aimed at the restoration of the 
community's equilibrium. There are no formal rules of evidence, no onus, no 
distinction between fact and law, and hearsay evidence is allowed to a certain extent. 
See Rautenbach 2005 SAJHR 331. 
25  See s 2. 
26  See s 3. 
27  The difference between official and living customary law is dealt with in general at 4 
below. 
28  Literally, to stand with what was decided. This phrase refers to the courts adhering 
to their own precedents. The court confirmed in Shabalala v Attorney-General, 
Transvaal; Gumede v Attorney-General, Transvaal 1995 1 SA 608 (T) that the 
principle still applies in South Africa. 
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2 Equal status of customary law 
Although there is no more doubt re the status of customary law, my 
arguments relating to the choosing and ascertainment of customary law are 
closely related to its status quo and it may be helpful to give a brief overview 
of the main developments. 
The first indication of the equal status of the common law and customary 
law came in the form of a principle formulated in the transitional 
Constitution.29 Principle XIII stipulated as follows:30 
… Indigenous law,31 like common law,32 shall be recognised and applied by 
the courts, subject to the fundamental rights contained in the Constitution and 
to legislation dealing specifically therewith. 
Although the final Constitution does not refer to the common law and 
customary law simultaneously, as this statement does,33 it contains other 
textual indications of their equal status. One such example is section 39(2), 
which requires the courts to "promote the spirit, purport and objects of the 
Bill of Rights" when developing the common or customary law. In addition, 
numerous decisions of the Constitutional Court have confirmed their equal 
status. For example, in Alexkor Ltd v The Richtersveld Community34 the 
Court pronounced: 
While in the past indigenous law was seen through the common-law lens, it 
must now be seen as an integral part of our law. Like all law it depends for its 
ultimate force and validity on the Constitution. Its validity must now be 
determined by reference not to common law, but to the Constitution. 
Also in Gumede v President of the Republic of South Africa35 it was 
reiterated that both the common and the customary law "sit under the 
                                            
29  The transitional Constitution contains a list of principles in schedule 4 which had to 
be taken into account when the final Constitution was adopted. S 71(1)(a) of the 
transition Constitution provided as follows: "A new constitutional text shall comply 
with the Constitutional Principles contained in Schedule 4". 
30  Emphasis provided. S 181 of the transitional Constitution indirectly recognised 
customary law by recognising the institution of traditional leadership, which operates 
under a system of customary law. 
31  The final Constitution replaced the term "indigenous law" with the term "customary 
law", which is also the term preferred by the judiciary and used in scholarly literature. 
32  Emphasis provided. It is interesting to note that this provision indirectly recognises 
the common law as well. The 1996 Constitution does not mention recognition and 
common law in a similar context, but only the customary law. 
33  Although it does refer to the application of customary law by the courts in s 211(3), 
it does not say "like the common law". See the discussion at 3 below regarding the 
applicability of customary law. 
34  Alexkor Ltd v The Richtersveld Community 2004 5 SA 460 (CC) para 51. Confirmed 
in Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha 2005 1 SA 580 (CC) para 43. 
35  Gumede v President of the Republic of South Africa 2009 3 SA 152 (CC) para 22. 
Confirmed in MM v MN 2013 4 SA 415 (CC) para 43. 
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umbrella of one controlling law – the Constitution" and "customary law … 
lives side by side with the common law and legislation". 
However, the constitutional recognition of customary law removed only the 
first hurdle standing in the way of its becoming a worthy member of the 
South African legal order, especially in adjudicating matters involving issues 
in customary law.36 It is one thing to give recognition but another thing to 
determine exactly what is being recognised and when it must be applied in 
court. The what question deals with the ascertainment of customary law 
rules and the when question deals with the issue of the application or the 
choice of laws.37 Let us deal with the latter question first. 
3 Choice of law: the when question 
The fact that customary law shares the podium with the common law does 
not mean that it applies automatically in any given case. In contrast to the 
common law, which is the general law of South Africa, the customary law 
applies only when it is applicable.38 In spite of its equal status, customary 
law is not a law of general application. It is a personal legal system which 
applies only to people living under a system of customary law. The 
qualification "when it is applicable" thus means that in given circumstances 
the courts will have to decide whether the customary law is applicable. This 
has to be done in accordance with the rules pertaining to the choice of law. 
South African law does not have a legal guide describing what those rules 
are, but before 1994 a set of principles which Bennett refers to as "judge-
made choice of law rules" had been developed.39 These choice-of-law rules 
were based on a sense of reasonableness and common sense, and mostly 
depended on the choice made by litigants.40 
Since 1994 there have been no decided cases that had to deal with this 
question specifically, because in most cases it was evident that the 
applicable law was customary law. There is no reason to believe that the 
                                            
36  In this context the expression "legal order" refers to the body of laws that make up 
the legal system of South Africa, including the common and customary law and all 
their sources. 
37  Also referred to as the conflict of laws or interpersonal conflict of laws. 
38  Section 211(3) of the Constitution. 
39  Rautenbach and Bekker Introduction to Legal Pluralism 42. 
40  See in general Rautenbach and Bekker Introduction to Legal Pluralism 42-44. Also 
see SALC Report on the Harmonisation of the Common and the Indigenous Law 27-
33 for a discussion of some of the circumstances which may play a role in deciding 
which legal system might be the most appropriate one to apply, if the litigants cannot 
agree on the appropriate law to be applied. 
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pre-1994 choice-of-law rules no longer apply.41 Nevertheless, the stipulation 
in the Constitution that "[t]he courts must apply customary law when that 
law is applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legislation that 
specifically deals with customary law"42 prompted the South African Law 
Reform Commission to investigate the issues pertaining to the choice-of-
law rules post-1994 because, in the words of the Commission:43 
The courts now need to know when they must apply rules from customary or 
common law, because notwithstanding recognition of customary law as part 
of the general law of the land, the circumstances in which it is to be applied 
are still vague. 
The outcome of the investigation resulted in a detailed report containing a 
proposed Bill on the Application of Customary Law,44 which was submitted 
in 1999 to the then Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, PM 
Maduna.45 In essence, the Commission recommended that the application 
of the customary law "should remain a matter of judicial discretion" but that 
there should be "clear and explicit choice of law rules to indicate when the 
common or customary law will be applicable to the facts of the case".46 The 
lack of further action from the department, and the continuing nonexistence 
of "clear and explicit choice of law rules", however, have not (yet) hampered 
the court's adjudication of customary law issues. They have applied 
customary law in a succession of cases without pondering much on the 
absence of formal choice-of-law rules. The viewpoint is generally that a 
litigant who wishes to have an action determined in terms of customary law 
must first prove that customary law is applicable. If it cannot be proven, the 
common law will apply.47 This requirement is not strange at all, if one 
considers that the South African law of evidence requires a litigant to prove 
what he or she asserts anyway.48 The default law is the common law 
because it has a wider range than customary law and, if a party cannot 
prove that customary law applies, the common law will be the applicable 
system. In other words, the common law applies to the whole of South 
Africa, whilst the customary law applies only to a limited category of people. 
                                            
41  Section 229 of the transitional Constitution provided for the continuance of laws in 
force before its commencement and clause 2 (schedule 6) in the final Constitution 
contains a similar provision. 
42  Section 211(3) of the Constitution. Emphasis provided. 
43  SALC Report on the Harmonisation of the Common and the Indigenous Law 1. 
44  SALC Report on the Harmonisation of the Common and the Indigenous Law 109. 
45  To date, there are no indications that this proposal is receiving further attention from 
the department of justice and constitutional development, and it has certainly not 
been submitted to parliament for discussion. 
46  SALC Report on the Harmonisation of the Common and the Indigenous Law xvi. 
47  See in general Maisela v Kgolane 2000 2 SA 370 (T) 376-377. 
48  According to Pillay v Krishna 1946 AD 946 952, this is the third rule of proof. 
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Although it seems to be business as usual, the minority judgment in Bhe v 
Magistrate, Khayelitsha49 makes it clear that any choice-of-law rules based 
on racial grounds will be treated with caution and due consideration of the 
facts of each case. According to Ngcobo J, who delivered the minority 
decision, the determination of choice of law must be "fair, just and equitable 
in the circumstances of the case"50 and must be informed by the following 
aspects: respecting the right of traditional communities to observe 
customary law; the preservation of customary law subject to the 
Constitution; and protecting vulnerable members of traditional communities 
living under a system of customary law.51 Although the Court's sensitivity 
towards racial considerations is understandable in the light of the political 
climate in South Africa, it is difficult to see how race could not play a role in 
deciding the applicable legal system, because the customary law generally 
applies only to members of African traditional communities. There are no 
known cases where one or both of the parties were not African, but of course 
the possibility that someone of another race may be acknowledged by a 
traditional community as a member of the community might lead to 
interesting developments in future.52 
For now, the issue of applicability remains unresolved and it might remain 
unresolved until such time that a court is directly confronted with the 
problem of choice of laws. Until this happens, there seems to be no dire 
need to formalise choice-of-law rules and each case will be dealt with on an 
ad hoc basis. 
We have reached the stage where there seems to be no doubt as to the 
status of customary law and, although it is less clear, the application of 
customary law seems to be fairly uncontroversial as well. There is, however, 
another area where the customary law in litigation remains fuzzy, namely 
the ascertainment of customary law in the courts. 
                                            
49  Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha 2005 1 SA 580 (CC) para 236. This case dealt with 
the unconstitutionality of the customary rule of male primogeniture, and resulted in 
its declaration of invalidity. The majority of the Court found it unnecessary to develop 
the rule and held that the Intestate Law of Succession Act 81 of 1987, a common 
law Act, has to apply to all estates. 
50  Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha 2005 1 SA 580 (CC) para 239. 
51  In accordance with the pre-1994 position regarding the choice-of-law rules, Ngcobo 
J explains that the starting point should always be the agreement between the 
parties. If no agreement has been reached as to the applicable law, other 
circumstances of the case must be considered to resolve the dispute relating to the 
choice of law. The final choice must be based on reasonableness, keeping in mind 
the particular circumstances of the case. 
52  One example could be where the parties belong to different social circumstances but 
contractually agree that the customary law of a particular society would apply to the 
execution of the contract. 
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4 Ascertainment of customary law: the what question 
In general, the judiciary finds the common law mostly in written sources, 
which include the Constitution, legislation, precedent, authoritative texts 
and, on the odd occasion, custom (which is distinct from customary law).53 
Flowing from the presumption that all courts know the law that they apply, 
the general rule is that judicial notice must be taken of the common law. 
Parties are thus not allowed to lead evidence to clarify common-law rules. 
They may advance arguments pertaining to the nature and scope of such 
rules but the final decision about the content of the law is made by the 
presiding officer.54 There might be issues that do not fall within the 
knowledge of the judge, which warrant expert guidance. For example, in 
criminal cases, although tried in terms of the common law, where the so-
called "cultural defence"55 has been raised during a trial, the courts have 
allowed experts to testify about the existence of cultural practices.56 The 
presumption that courts know the law is based on the fact that the common 
law is a fairly uniform, inflexible system which depends largely on written 
sources.57 The judicial officer need only consult those sources to find the 
law. As already explained, one exception is where a party alleges that a 
common-law custom exists. In such a case, the court may allow evidence 
in a criminal case as to the existence and scope of the custom, to be 
satisfied beyond any reasonable doubt that the custom does in fact exist.58 
Proving a common-law custom is thus a question of fact. 
In terms of the common law, a judicial officer may also take judicial notice 
of certain facts which are general knowledge or can easily be ascertained 
without the need to present evidence to prove them.59 Examples include the 
                                            
53  This is the common-law principle for proving a common-law custom, which is an 
exception to the general law of the land. See the discussion at 1 above and note 17 
in particular.  
54  Schwikkard et al Principles of Evidence 489-490. 
55  There is no such thing as a formal "cultural defence" in South African law, although 
there are a few decisions where the defence of an accused relied on culture. See 
the discussion of Rautenbach and Matthee 2010 J Legal Plur 118-126. 
56  In Jezile v S 2015 2 SACR 452 (WCC) the accused appealed his conviction and 
sentence for various counts of rape, human trafficking and assault of an underage 
girl. The accused raised as one of his defences the practice of ukuthwala, which 
entails in general the mock abduction of a girl to marry her. Both the state and the 
accused called expert witnesses to explain the meaning and prevalence of the 
custom and, in addition, the Court elicited the assistance of amici curiae to further 
assist the Court. 
57  SALC Report on the Harmonisation of the Common and the Indigenous Law 99. 
58  Bekker and Van der Merwe 2011 SAPL 120. 
59  Also see Bekker and Van der Merwe 2011 SAPL 117: "Judicial notice means that a 
fact is so well known or immediately and accurately ascertainable that it would make 
no sense to produce evidence on it." 
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decline of the value of money, political and constitutional conditions, animal 
behaviour, social conditions, crime, historical facts, and the conditions of 
roads.60 In a very interesting case dealing with the constitutionality of the 
ritual of bull killing during a Zulu festival, the Court also relied on its own 
experiences regarding the ritual to come to the conclusion that the 
applicants' conclusion that the ritual is cruel to animals was 
unsubstantiated.61 In Smit v His Majesty King Goodwill Zwelithini 
Kabhekuzulu,62 Van Der Reyden J commented:63 
As will appear from the direct evidence of persons who have attended the 
ceremony, such as myself, and the evidence of experts on Zulu customs and 
traditions, the applicants' belief is ill-informed and is based on a jaundiced and 
distorted view of the Ukweshama [bull killing]. 
And also:64 
I have on many occasions attended the ceremony and have personally 
witnessed the killing of the full (sic). I dispute the allegations regarding the 
killing of the bull. 
Even though these examples exist, courts should apply the process of 
judicial notice with caution because it deprives the parties of the opportunity 
to cross-examine the witnesses.65 
Thus, to summarise: the common law of evidence obliges a judicial officer 
to take judicial notice of the common law and to consider evidence regarding 
a common-law custom, and gives a discretion to such an officer to take 
judicial notice of certain well-known facts. 
The nature of customary law is different. Depending on its source, it can be 
categorised as either official customary law or living customary law. The 
official customary law includes, amongst other things, legislation,66 
                                            
60  See the examples given by Schwikkard et al Principles of Evidence 478-489. 
61  See Smit v His Majesty King Goodwill Zwelithini Kabhekuzulu 2009 JDR 1361 (KZP), 
and also the discussion by Rautenbach "Umkhosi Ukweshwama: Revival of a Zulu 
Festival" 63-89. 
62  Smit v His Majesty King Goodwill Zwelithini Kabhekuzulu 2009 JDR 1361 (KZP) 10. 
Emphasis provided. 
63  Smit v His Majesty King Goodwill Zwelithini Kabhekuzulu 2009 JDR 1361 (KZP) 10. 
Emphasis provided. 
64  Smit v His Majesty King Goodwill Zwelithini Kabhekuzulu 2009 JDR 1361 (KZP) 10. 
65  Schwikkard et al Principles of Evidence 479. 
66  For example the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998; KwaZulu Act 
on the Code of Zulu Law 16 of 1985; Black Administration Act 38 of 1927; Traditional 
Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003 
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precedent,67 authoritative textbooks68 and reports,69 whilst living customary 
law reflects the present-day customs and practices of traditional 
communities.70 It is generally accepted that Alexkor Ltd v The Richtersveld 
Community71 was the first case that dealt with the distinction between official 
and living customary law, but this is not correct. It might be the first 
Constitutional Court judgment post 1994 dealing with this distinction, but it 
is obvious from earlier precedents that the judiciary was fully aware of the 
importance of the difference. For example, in 1944 in Sigcau v Sigcau72 the 
Appellate Division acknowledged the challenges of oral Pondo law, which 
had to be proved by means of evidence: 
On appeal from that decision this Court is faced with a difficult problem. Pondo 
law and custom is a body of unwritten law save for certain decisions of the 
Native Appeal Court and statements as to Native Law and Custom made by 
native assessors which are recorded in the reports of the Native Appeal Court, 
and save for certain passages in books dealing with native custom. But even 
such records as there are little more than records of traditions, records of what 
someone at some time said the custom was. In the reported cases the 
recorded opinions of assessors naturally harden into law and certain books 
are to some extent accepted as accurately stating what native custom is. But 
apart from making what use is possible of these scanty records, the only way 
in which the Court can determine a disputed point, which has to be decided 
according to native custom, is to hear evidence as to that custom from those 
best qualified to give it and to decide the dispute in accordance with such 
evidence as appears in the circumstances to be most probably correct. 
Also in Mabena v Letsoalo,73 in which judgment was delivered in 1997, the 
Transvaal High Court acknowledged that "customary law exists not only in 
the 'official version' as documented by writers; there also is the 'living law', 
denoting 'law actually observed by African communities'". 
The fact that living customary law is sourced in the community and is 
therefore flexible has challenged the reasoning of the judiciary on a number 
of occasions, and their approach to this problem has not been consistent. 
At least two issues seem to occupy the minds of the judiciary. The first one 
is the question of whether or not the different types of customary law (official 
and living) warrant different approaches in determining its content. The 
second issue deals with the question of whether a court should take judicial 
                                            
67  Including also the judgments of the abolished Appeal Courts for Commissioners' 
Courts. 
68  The textbook written by Schapera Handbook of Tswana Law and Custom is among 
one of the popular textbooks that was used as authority in the courts. 
69  For example, Reports of the South African Law Reform Commission. 
70  Rautenbach and Bekker Introduction to Legal Pluralism 49. 
71  Alexkor Ltd v The Richtersveld Community 2004 5 SA 460 (CC) paras 54-60. In 
general see Ozoemena 2015 PER 977. 
72  Sigcau v Sigcau 1944 AD 67 76. Emphasis provided. 
73  Mabena v Letsoalo 1998 2 SA 1068 (T) 1074. 
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notice of living customary law as a question of law or a question of fact.74 
As already pointed out, the Constitution does not provide answers to either 
of these questions and, while on the subject, neither does the Law of 
Evidence Amendment Act, which is still operable. Before the 
commencement of this Act, customary law had to be proved "in the same 
manner as any other custom".75 During the existence of the commissioners' 
courts, the then Appellate Division held that "in the ordinary courts of law 
[African] custom must be proved in the same manner as any other custom". 
The Law of Evidence Amendment Act changed this position. Section 1(1) of 
this Act stipulates: 
Any court may take judicial notice of the law of a foreign state and of 
indigenous law in so far as such law can be ascertained readily and with 
sufficient certainty: Provided that indigenous law shall not be opposed to the 
principles of public policy and natural justice … .76 
In addition, section 1(2) of the Act allows a party to adduce evidence to 
establish a rule which is in doubt.77 The term "ascertainment" is derived from 
the verb "to ascertain" which means to "find (something) out for certain" or 
"to make sure of".78 Thus, it should be evident that a court can take judicial 
notice only of something that is clear. Considering the main differences 
between official and living customary law,79 it should also be obvious that 
                                            
74  The questions are similar in other pluralistic jurisdictions – see, for example, Gorang 
2015 JLPG 93-95. 
75  Mosii v Motseoakhumo 1954 3 SA 919 (A) 930C-D. The position in the 
commissioners' courts was different. They were established to hear cases between 
Africans only. It was unnecessary to prove customary law in those courts because, 
as explained in Ngcobo v Ngcobo 1929 AD 233 236, "[t]he customs and usages form 
the unwritten law. Many of these must be well known to the Judges and ascertainable 
from decided cases and treatises upon Native customs. If we were to insist on every 
usage and practice being proved by evidence, as we prove trade and other customs 
in our courts, it may render the application of Native usage and practice unworkable, 
for then Native cases might become too expensive and too protracted". The 
Commissioners' Courts were established in terms of the Black Administration Act 38 
of 1927 and abolished in 1986 by the Special Courts for Blacks Abolition Act 34 of 
1986. 
76  Emphasis provided.  
77  Section 1(2) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 provides: "The 
provisions of subsection (1) shall not preclude any party from adducing evidence of 
the substance of a legal rule contemplated in that subsection which is in issue at the 
proceedings concerned." Authors have argued that this provision is redundant and 
should be repealed. See Bekker and Van der Merwe 2011 SAPL 122. 
78  See English Oxford Living Dictionaries 2017 https://en.oxforddictionaries.com 
/definition/ascertain. 
79  According to Ngcobo J, who delivered a dissenting judgment in Bhe v Magistrate, 
Khayelitsha 2005 1 SA 580 (CC) paras 42-49, there are three types of customary 
law, namely: living customary law practised in the community; law found in statutes, 
precedent and textbooks; and law taught in academic institutions. 
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only official customary law can provide a readily accessible source of those 
rules. Therefore, this provision cannot be interpreted other than as giving a 
discretion to a judicial officer to take judicial notice of the official customary 
law, because that is the only customary law that can be determined with 
certainty. If there is a dispute as to the existence of an official rule, however, 
a party may use section 1(2) to adduce evidence to establish the new rule.80 
Seen this way, the official customary law appears to be a question of law. 
As pointed out by Bennett in practice: 
This provision has been applicable only when an official version of customary 
law is in issue. The courts are in no position to take judicial notice of the living 
law, which by its nature, is usually an as yet unrecorded social practice.81 
Thus, section 1(1) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act82 assists the 
court only if the rule to be determined is official customary law. The situation 
regarding living customary law seems to be different. Until recently83 living 
customary law was treated as fact rather than law, similar to proving a 
common-law custom.84 This means that customary law that could not be 
determined by consulting official sources (legislation or precedent) had to 
be proved by means of evidence, such as that of anthropologists, members 
of the community and/or traditional leaders.85 Also, in a more recent 
decision, Hlophe v Mahlalela,86 the High Court held that where customary 
law is not readily ascertainable with sufficient certainty, a party relying on 
customary law must prove it "by adducing expert evidence to establish it as 
a fact".87 
Bennett88 seems to have the distinction between official and living 
customary law in mind when he explains that customary law can be treated 
as law or fact. When it is treated as fact, thus as living customary law, 
witnesses should be called. After hearing the evidence the court will then 
draw a legal conclusion based on the facts. When it is treated as law, thus 
                                            
80  Evidence in terms of this s was allowed in Mabena v Letsoalo 1998 2 SA 1068 (T) 
1075 to prove the development of a rule to allow the mother of a woman to negotiate 
lobolo on her behalf. 
81  Rautenbach and Bekker Introduction to the Legal Pluralism 48. 
82  Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988. 
83  A different view was taken in MM v MN 2013 4 SA 415 (CC), which is discussed 
below. 
84  See Ex parte Minister of Native Affairs: In re Yako v Beyi 1948 1 SA 388 (A) 394-
395; Mosii v Motseoakhumo 1954 3 SA 919 (A) 930; and Masenya v Seleka Tribal 
Authority 1981 1 SA 522 (T) 524 where customary law had to be proven similar to a 
common-law custom. However, all of these cases were handed down before the Law 
of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 came into operation. 
85  Bennett Application of Customary Law 19. Also see Harris 1998 JCULR 78. 
86  Hlophe v Mahlalela 1998 1 SA 449 (T). 
87  Hlophe v Mahlalela 1998 1 SA 449 (T) 457E-F. Emphasis provided. 
88  Bennett Sourcebook of African Customary Law 141. 
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official customary law, the rules must be validated or determined by referring 
to authentic texts such as legislation, precedent and other authoritative 
sources. 
The different approaches to determining the content of official and living 
customary law can also be explained by referring to the fundamental 
differences between the two types or branches of customary law. The 
official customary law refers to those rules which have been written down, 
either in an Act, as a precedent, or in any other authoritative written source. 
Those rules may be taken into account by means of judicial notice, which 
can then be "updated" by means of evidence. They might, however, not 
accord with contemporary changes in the communities where they apply, 
and this may call for development in terms of section 39(2) of the 
Constitution. However, in the case of living customary law, the rules are 
grounded in the community. Unless a judicial officer is a member of such a 
community, there is no way he or she is going to know what the content of 
the customary law rules is. The presentation of evidence would thus be 
essential to find the applicable law. These steps are necessary to 
distinguish between rules which can be regarded as mere social practices 
and those that are binding and thus regarded as law. After determination of 
the legal rules, their constitutionality can also be tested in terms of the 
Constitution, and developed, if need be. 
It seems, however, as if these differences between official and living 
customary law and between law and facts were disregarded by the majority 
in MM v MN,89 where Froneman J stated that the "[d]etermination of 
customary law is a question of law, as is determination of the common 
law".90 In addition, he declared that:91 
… a court is obliged to satisfy itself, as a matter of law, on the content of 
customary law, and its task in this regard may be more onerous where the 
customary-law rule at stake is a matter of controversy. With the constitutional 
recognition of customary law, this has become a responsibility of the courts. It 
is incumbent on our courts to take steps to satisfy themselves as to the content 
of customary law and, where necessary, to evaluate local custom in order to 
ascertain the content of the relevant legal rule.  
Although the Court may claim to regard the customary law as a "matter of 
law", the words "to evaluate local custom in order to ascertain the content 
of the relevant legal rule" seems to cast doubt on the contention. Surely this 
practice cannot mean anything other than to require factual evidence from 
                                            
89  MM v MN 2013 4 SA 415 (CC). 
90  MM v MN 2013 4 SA 415 (CC) para 47. This case has also been referred to as 
Mayelane v Ngwenyama in the literature. 
91  MM v MN 2013 4 SA 415 (CC) para 48. Emphasis provided. 
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which the Court can deduce a rule of customary law, which makes its 
determination a matter of fact?92 The Court allowed additional evidence and 
testimony of individuals involved in polygynous Tsonga marriages, advisors 
to traditional leaders, traditional leaders and other experts, such as 
anthropologists, which eventually led to a plethora of conflicting evidence.93 
Why then was it so important to say that customary law is a matter of law 
and not a matter of evidence? Could it be that the Court did not want to 
create the impression that it was treating customary law differently from the 
common law? This seems to be the case, if one considers this explanation 
given by the Court:94 
We do not think this picture of Xitsonga [Tsonga] customary law that the 
further evidence has given us should be viewed as presenting a difficulty in 
deciding the case before us. It is a necessary process that courts must go 
through to give customary law its proper place. 
Although the Court's sentiments regarding the "proper place" of customary 
law are laudable, it is my contention that a different approach to the 
determination of customary law does not relate to its status at all. The status 
of the customary law is uncontested, but to determine its content, especially 
that of living law, requires a different approach than in the context of the 
common law. Thus, I agree with the dissenting viewpoint of Zondo J, who 
held that "[c]ustoms and usages 'traditionally observed' by any group of 
people [are] a question of fact and not of law. When there is a material 
dispute of fact in a matter brought to court by way of motion proceedings, it 
cannot be decided on the papers" and, therefore, additional evidence 
should not have been allowed.95 
The dissenting viewpoint in MM v MN96 regarding the evidentiary rules when 
dealing with the issue of ascertainment clearly illustrates the difficulties the 
judiciary is faced with. The problem is exacerbated by a piece of legislation 
that is out-dated. The Law of Evidence Amendment Act97 stems from a time 
when foreign law and customary law were treated the same. They do not 
have the same status - the common and customary law do. It is not fair to 
expect the courts to bend the rules of evidence to accommodate customary 
law at all costs, especially at the cost of legal certainty. Therefore, I partly 
                                            
92  The court directed the parties and the amici curiae to file additional statements 
regarding the content of Tsonga customary law, which they did in an abundant 
fashion, leaving the court with a diversity of conflicting responses. See MM v MN 
2013 4 SA 415 (CC) para 53 note 51. 
93  MM v MN 2013 4 SA 415 (CC) para 54. 
94  MM v MN 2013 4 SA 415 (CC) para 60. Emphasis provided. 
95  See MM v MN 2013 4 SA 415 (CC) para 126. 
96  MM v MN 2013 4 SA 415 (CC). 
97  Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988. 
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agree with the recommendations made by Bekker and Van der Merwe.98 To 
begin with, the reference to the customary law99 in section 1(1) of the Law 
of Evidence Amendment Act should be deleted; the Act should apply only 
to the ascertainment of foreign law. A court should be allowed to take judicial 
notice of the official customary law as if it were taking notice of the common 
law. Secondly, as proposed by the authors, section 1(2) of the Law of 
Evidence Amendment Act should no longer be used as authority for calling 
witnesses to ascertain living customary law, because mentioning it in the 
same breath as foreign law negates the equal status of customary law and 
common law. In its stead the draft provision contained in the proposed 
Application of Customary Law Bill should be enacted. This proposal was 
made more than 17 years ago by the South African Law Commission, but 
was not taken any further.100 It provides as follows: 
8(1) In order to prove the existence or content of a rule of customary law, 
or foreign customary law, a court may - 
(a) consult cases, textbooks and other authoritative sources; 
(b) receive expert opinions either orally or in writing; and 
(c) appoint assessors from the community in which the rule of 
customary law applies.101 
                                            
98  Bekker and Van der Merwe 2011 SAPL 122. 
99  The Act uses old terminology, namely indigenous law. 
100  SALC Report on the Harmonisation of the Common and the Indigenous Law 111. 
101  Currently there is no provision for the appointment of assessors in the Constitutional 
Court, but their participation in the High Court and magistrates' courts could be a 
great advantage. Existing legislation makes provision for two types of experts. 
Firstly, a magistrate may appointment "expert" assessors in civil matters. This 
provision could provide a handy tool to obtain the services of customary law experts 
in cases dealing with custom which might fall beyond the scope of the presiding 
officer's expertise. The assessors need not be persons with legal training and could 
be, for example, traditional leaders or authoritative members of the community. The 
words "advisory capacity" also make it clear that the assessor has no voice in the 
actual determination of the outcome of the case. There is, however, the issue of 
costs, because the cost of securing the appointment of an assessor shall be costs 
in the action, which might discourage parties from obtaining the services of 
assessors during civil proceedings. Secondly, a magistrate may appoint so-called 
"lay assessors" in criminal cases in terms of s 93ter of the Magistrates' Courts Act 
32 of 1944, if he or she thinks it would be "expedient for the administration of justice". 
Assessors (up to two) can be appointed at two stages: before any evidence has been 
led or after a verdict of guilty has been delivered and the presiding officer is 
considering a "community-based punishment". In order to decide if it would be 
expedient for the administration of justice, the presiding officer should take into 
account, amongst other things, the "cultural and social environment from which the 
accused originates". If, however, the accused is standing trial on a charge of murder, 
the presiding officer must appoint two assessors, unless the accused requests that 
the trial proceeds without assessors. The Act does not prescribe minimum skills or 
experiences for an assessor to be appointed in trials or during sentence, but it is 
common practice to summon a respected member of the community of the accused. 
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(2) The provisions of subsection (1) shall not prevent a party from 
presenting evidence of a rule contemplated in that subsection. 
This provision confers a discretion upon the court to consult official sources 
and expert opinions, and to appoint assessors, in order to determine the 
existence of a customary law rule. In the light of the fact that the Constitution 
recognises customary law subject to the Constitution and other legislation, 
consideration should be given to adding the word "legislation" as a source 
which might be used as well. Although criticism has been raised against the 
fossilisation of customary law in statutes, they remain a helpful official 
source of customary rules. Contemporary customary law statutes such as 
the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act102 have been hailed by the 
judiciary as:103 
… a belated but welcome and ambitious legislative effort to remedy the 
historical humiliation and exclusion meted out to spouses in marriages which 
were entered into in accordance with the law and culture of the indigenous 
African people of this country. 
Although the Act is not flawless and certain provisions have been declared 
unconstitutional,104 it is generally regarded as a welcome development in 
South African law. It does not codify the customary law of marriage in its 
entirety and acknowledges the relevance of customary law regarding the 
negotiations and celebrations of the marriage;105 the determination of blood 
relations and affinity;106 the customary rights and powers of females;107 
maintenance arrangements;108 and the validity of customary marriages 
concluded before the commencement of the Act. The Act thus combines the 
judicial approach to law and to facts.  
My understanding of this mixed approach is as follows. Step 1, the presiding 
officer takes judicial notice of the official customary law, for example the 
consent of the spouses' requirement, because they are empowered by the 
law of evidence to take judicial notice of the law. However, the requirement 
that the marriage be celebrated in terms of customary law needs an 
additional step, because the relevant customary rules for the celebration, 
                                            
102  Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. 
103  Gumede v President of the Republic of South Africa 2009 3 SA 152 (CC) para 16. 
104  For example, s 7(1) was declared unconstitutional in Gumede v President of the 
Republic of South Africa 2009 3 SA 152 (CC) as far as it relates to monogamous 
customary marriages. All monogamous customary marriages entered into before the 
Act came into operation are, as from 8 December 2008 (the date of the judgment), 
ipso facto in community of property and of profit and loss between the spouses. 
105  Section 3(1) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. 
106  Section 3(6) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. 
107  Section 6 of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. 
108  Section 7 of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. 
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which differ from community to community, do not fall within the personal 
knowledge of the presiding officer. Thus, step 2 follows, namely determining 
those rules. He or she cannot take judicial notice of it because they do not 
fall within his or her personal knowledge, and the parties must prove it by 
way of evidence of fact, from which the court then draws a conclusion of the 
relevant customary rules. During this process, constitutional arguments can 
be raised to attack the constitutionality either of the official customary law 
rule (during step 1) or of the living customary rule (during step 2). Moreover, 
during step 1 the court must "when interpreting any legislation", thus also 
when interpreting customary law statutes, promote "the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights".109 Similarly, during step 2, if the "spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights" necessitates it, the judiciary must develop 
the customary law. 
In Shilubana v Nwamitwa110 there was no official customary law that 
regulated the succession to leadership within a traditional community. The 
rules had to be determined by looking at living customary law. Thus, there 
was no step 1, which explains why the court held that the content of a 
particular customary norm must be determined by following a specific 
process. In the light of its importance, the relevant section is cited in full.111 
… First, it will be necessary to consider the traditions of the community 
concerned. Customary law is a body of rules and norms that has developed 
over the centuries. An enquiry into the position under customary law will 
therefore invariably involve a consideration of the past practice of the 
community. Such a consideration also focuses the enquiry on customary law 
in its own setting rather than in terms of the common-law paradigm, in line with 
the approach set out in Bhe. Equally, as this court noted in Richtersveld, courts 
embarking on this leg of the enquiry must be cautious of historical records, 
because of the distorting tendency of older authorities to view customary law 
through legal conceptions foreign to it.  
It is important to respect the right of communities that observe systems of 
customary law to develop their law. This is the second factor that courts must 
consider. The right of communities under s 211(2) includes the right of 
traditional authorities to amend and repeal their own customs. As has been 
repeatedly emphasised by this and other courts, customary law is by its nature 
a constantly evolving system. Under pre-democratic colonial and apartheid 
regimes, this development was frustrated and customary law stagnated. This 
stagnation should not continue, and the free development by communities of 
their own laws to meet the needs of a rapidly changing society must be 
respected and facilitated.  
It follows that the practice of a particular community is relevant when 
determining the content of a customary-law norm. As this court held in 
Richtersveld, the content of customary law must be determined with reference 
to both the history and the usage of the community concerned. 'Living' 
customary law is not always easy to establish and it may sometimes not be 
                                            
109  Section 39(2) of the Constitution. 
110  Shilubana v Nwamitwa 2008 9 BCLR 914 (CC). 
111  Shilubana v Nwamitwa 2008 9 BCLR 914 (CC) paras 44-49. Notes omitted. 
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possible to determine a new position with clarity. Where there is, however, a 
dispute over the law of a community, parties should strive to place evidence 
of the present practice of that community before the courts, and courts have 
a duty to examine the law in the context of a community and to acknowledge 
developments if they have occurred.  
Thirdly, courts must be cognisant of the fact that customary law, like any other 
law, regulates the lives of people. The need for flexibility and the imperative to 
facilitate development must be balanced against the value of legal certainty, 
respect for vested rights, and the protection of constitutional rights. In Bhe the 
majority of this court held that it could not leave the customary law of 
succession to develop in a piecemeal and sometimes slow fashion, since this 
would provide inadequate protection to women and children. The possibility 
for parties to reach agreement on the devolution of an estate was explicitly left 
open in order to facilitate the development of customary law so far as possible,  
consistent with protecting rights. The outcome of this balancing act will depend 
on the facts of each case. Relevant factors in this enquiry will include, but are 
not limited to, the nature of the law in question, in particular the implications of 
change for constitutional and other legal rights; the process by which the 
alleged change has occurred or is occurring; and the vulnerability of parties 
affected by the law. 
Furthermore, while development of customary law by the courts is distinct 
from its development by a customary community, a court engaged in the 
adjudication of a customary-law matter must remain mindful of its obligations 
under s 39(2) of the Constitution to promote the spirit, purport and objects of 
the Bill of Rights. This court held in Carmichele v Minister of Safety and 
Security that the section imposes an obligation on courts to consider whether 
there is a need to develop the common law to bring it into line with the 
Constitution, and to develop it if so. The same is true of customary law.  
To sum up: where there is a dispute over the legal position under customary 
law, a court must consider both the traditions and the present practice of the 
community. If development happens within the community, the court must 
strive to recognise and give effect to that development, to the extent consistent 
with adequately upholding the protection of rights. In addition, the imperative 
of s 39(2) must be acted on when necessary, and deference should be paid 
to the development by a customary community of its own laws and customs 
where this is possible, consistent with the continuing effective operation of the 
law. 
It is evident from this passage that the duty to place evidence of a customary 
law rule before the court remains on the parties alleging the existence of 
such a rule. If there are differences between past and present practices, the 
latter will be recognised if they are consistent with constitutional values and 
rights. 
5 Conclusion 
The South African judiciary seems to have a disadvantage in comparison 
with its counterparts in traditional courts.112 Traditional courts do not apply 
                                            
112  Those courts still operate under the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927. S 12 
confers civil jurisdiction on a traditional authority to hear cases between Africans and 
s 20 confers criminal jurisdiction on such an authority to litigate crimes committed 
within the jurisdiction of the traditional authority. See in general, Rautenbach "South 
Africa: Legal Recognition of Traditional Courts" 121-151. 
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the common law rules of evidence to determine the law. In other words, they 
do not consider questions dealing with fact or law. Furthermore, it is a well-
known fact that a traditional authority has the power to make and develop 
the customary law.113 They derive this power from custom and not from the 
Constitution. The general courts, however, derive the power to develop both 
the common and customary law from the Constitution. The South African 
judiciary adjudicates customary law by using tools of evidence firmly rooted 
in the common law. Considering this, is it then fair to expect it to deal with 
the ascertainment of customary law without guidance in the form of 
legislation which would ensure at least conformity and consistency in 
dealing with customary law in the general courts?  
Although I essentially agree with the viewpoint of the majority in MM v MN114 
that "the recognition of customary law as a legal system that lives side-by-
side with the common law and legislation requires innovation in determining 
its 'living' content", I am not convinced that a total disregard of the rules of 
evidence qualifies as such an innovation. There is an assurance in the 
knowledge that the actions of a court are to a certain extent predictable, 
uniform and in line with existing law. For this reason, the dissenting 
judgment of Zondo J in MM v MN115 is legally sound and to be preferred. He 
did not agree with the majority judgment's total disregard of the rules of 
evidence. His starting point in considering the second marriage concluded 
by the deceased was to look at the official customary law, namely the 
requirements in terms of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act.116 
According to him the crucial question to ask was if the second marriage had 
been "negotiated and entered into or celebrated in accordance with 
customary law".117 If yes, then the second marriage was valid and, if no, it 
was invalid. In this case the second wife had not presented any evidence to 
support her claim that she too had been married to the deceased, and she 
had not discharged the onus of proving that a marriage did indeed exist; 
there was thus no need to investigate if the consent of the first wife was 
necessary to conclude a second marriage. Zondo J rightly points out that 
the majority's call for additional evidence regarding the existence of a 
custom that requires the consent of the first wife created the situation where 
                                            
113  Schapera 1957 J Afr L 150: "[A]mong the Tswana, chiefs have from time immemorial 
had the power to change the law, either by abolishing or amending an existing usage 
or establishing a new rule of conduct." Also see Shilubana v Nwamitwa 2008 9 BCLR 
914 (CC); Mmusinyane 2009 PER 150-154. 
114  MM v MN 2013 4 SA 415 (CC) para 43. 
115  MM v MN 2013 4 SA 415 (CC) para 43. 
116  Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. 
117  As required in terms of s 3(1)(b) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 
of 1998. See MM v MN 2013 4 SA 415 (CC) paras 101-102. 
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the court was faced with conflicting evidence which could not be resolved, 
because the evidence could not be subjected to cross-examination. 
The difficulties the Constitutional Court was facing in MM v MN118 are 
exemplary of how difficult it is to adjudicate living customary law. The case 
was heard by ten judges. Six of them delivered the majority judgment and 
the other four delivered dissenting judgments, arguing that it was not 
necessary to develop living customary law as the majority had. It is therefore 
my contention that it would be in the interest of legal uniformity and certainty 
that legislation be enacted to regulate the approach to ascertaining 
customary law in the courts. The proposals made by the South African Law 
Commission in 1999 would be a good starting point.119 This would obviate 
the judiciary's having to perform legal gymnastics to circumvent the 
restraints set by the rules of evidence in determining the content of living 
customary law.  
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